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Spinoza, Carr, and the ethics of
The Twenty Years’ Crisis
SEA´N MOLLOY*
Abstract. This article reads Carr through the lens of Spinoza’s ethics, and Spinoza through the
prism of Carr’s IR Theory. The argument of the piece is that there are signiﬁcant parallels in
the ethical projects of both writers, which upon further examination reveal important aspects
of global political life and the nature and limits of ethics in International Relations. The close,
critical examination of Spinoza ad Carr undertaken in this article also sheds light on the most
controversial aspect of Carr’s career, his advocacy of appeasement in Nazi Germany.
Sea´n Molloy is Lecturer in International Relations and Director of Postgraduate Research
Admissions, University of Edinburgh.
The rediscovery of Realism as an ethical theory of International Relations (IR) is
arguably one of the more important developments in the discipline since the turn of
the century – although well known to experts on Realist theory, Realism’s ethical
commitments and powerful critiques have until recently been largely ignored or mis-
understood by its critics.1 Realism is establishing itself not simply as a strategic
theory of IR but as a serious alternative to more entrenched ethical discourses within
IR. The majority of this work has centred round the ﬁgure of Hans J. Morgenthau,
either in his own right, or as part of an intellectual tradition that encompasses a
range of thinkers from Thucydides and Aristotle to Nietzsche and Weber.2 The focus
on Morgenthau is essential, given both his centrality to the Realist tradition and the
very prominent role ethical considerations played within his thought. This focus,
however, has led to the neglect of other approaches to international ethics within
the family of ideas referred to as Realism. Perhaps the most signiﬁcant neglected
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1 See Sea´n Molloy, ‘Hans J. Morgenthau Versus E. H. Carr: Conﬂicting Conceptions of Ethics in Realism’,
in D. S. A Bell, Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 83–4.
2 See, for example, Alasdair Murray, Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan
Ethics (Edinburgh: Keele University Press, 1997); Richard Ned Lebow, The Tragic Vision of Politics:
Ethics, Interests, and Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Michael C. Williams,
The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005).
ﬁgure in the pantheon of Realist ethical thinkers is E. H. Carr. Although some mention
of his treatment of ethical themes has been made in several excellent studies since the
1990s, there have been few treatments dedicated speciﬁcally to this dimension of his
work.3 This relative neglect of Carr is puzzling given his attention to the question of
international morality, which he regarded ‘the most obscure and difﬁcult problem in
the whole range of international studies’.4 The premise of the article is that there is
much to be gained from reading Carr in the light of Spinoza – a ﬁgure cited in The
Twenty Years’ Crisis, but whose signiﬁcance lies almost as much in what Carr fails to
recognise as in what Carr identiﬁes as important in the Dutch philosopher’s con-
tribution to Realism in IR.5 This article then is both a clariﬁcation of the relation-
ship between Carr and Spinoza, but also an investigation of the deeper and broader
parallels between Realist ethics and Spinozist philosophy.
Fittingly, given Spinoza’s occupation as a lens grinder, the article proceeds by means
of refraction: investigating Carr’s ethics through the lens of Spinoza’s philosophy,
and Spinoza’s potential contribution to IR through Carr’s ethics. The advantage of
reading Carr and Spinoza in tandem is that Spinoza, a ﬁgure neglected if not com-
pletely ignored within IR compared to other political philosophers such as Kant
and Hobbes, can enter its thought world and Carr, a theorist with much to offer
ethics, gain a greater role within IR’s ethical discourse. The argument of the article
is not so much that Spinoza was a deﬁning inﬂuence on Carr, but that the degree of
convergence between their positions is signiﬁcant in its own right, whether the con-
vergence is by design, coincidence, or as in the case of Nietzsche, ‘instinctive’.6 The
ﬁrst part of the article examines Carr’s depiction of Spinoza, which I argue is not
so much inaccurate as incomplete. The second part seeks to recover the valuable
insights of Spinoza on the nature of politics and ethics that Carr ignores or neglects.
The third section assesses Spinoza by reference to Carr’s critique of Realism in The
Twenty Year’s Crisis, ﬁnding that Spinoza is not a ‘pure realist’ by Carr’s standards,
but rather a plural or hetero-realist. The ﬁnal section examines Carr’s own position
on international ethics by reference to the Spinozist understanding of ethics as being
primarily governed by the preservation of the self, the promotion of self-interest, and
the power of the emotions and the crucial distinction between ethics and morality.
Viewing Carr through Spinozist lenses and Spinoza through the prism of The Twenty
3 The two most developed pieces speciﬁcally dedicated to Carr’s ethics are Paul Rich, ‘E. H. Carr and
the Quest for Moral Revolution in International Relations’, Michael Cox (ed.), E. H. Carr: A Critical
Appraisal (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2000); and Sea´n Molloy, ‘Hans J. Morgenthau Versus E.
H. Carr: Conﬂicting Conceptions of Ethics in Realism’, in D. S. A. Bell, Political Thought and Inter-
national Relations. Variations on a Realist Theme (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). Excellent
general studies of Carr’s life and work include: Jonathan Haslam, The Vices of Integrity: E. H. Carr,
1892–1982 (London: Verso, 2000); Charles Jones, E. H. Carr: A Duty to Lie (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998); and Michael Cox’s introduction to the 2001 edition of The Twenty Years’
Crisis (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001). For the IR context in which Carr operated see Peter Wilson,
‘Carr and his Early Critics: Responses to The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1939–46’, in Michael Cox (ed.),
E. H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2000); and Peter Wilson, ‘The
Myth of the First Great Debate’, Review of International Studies, 24:5 (1998).
4 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 135. Carr used the terms ethics and morality interchangeably.
5 Necati Polat indicates an afﬁnity between the Realist and Spinozist projects in Alternatives, 35 (2010),
p. 321.
6 In a letter to Franz Overbeck, Nietzsche writes: ‘I have a precursor, and what a precursor! I hardly
knew Spinoza: what brought me to him now was the guidance of instinct’, Friedrich Nietzsche, Selected
Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, trans. and ed. Christopher Middleton (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1969),
p. 177.
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Years’ Crisis also allows greater understanding of Carr’s most controversial policy
prescription, the appeasement of Nazi Germany.
Carr on Spinoza
As Carr is one of the few IR theorists to engage with Spinoza his texts are the perfect
location to commence, but not conclude, an investigation of Spinoza’s potential con-
tribution to IR. At ﬁrst glance, the signiﬁcance of Spinoza to E. H. Carr is relatively
minor. Spinoza is presented, along with Bodin and Hobbes, as an inheritor of the
‘extraordinary vigour and vitality’ of Machiavelli. As a Realist, Spinoza is identiﬁed
with three tenets: ﬁrstly, that history is understandable through the analysis of cause
and effect, secondly that theory should be derived from practice, not practice from
theory, and ﬁnally that politics is not a function of ethics, but rather that ethics is
a function of politics.7 Spinoza’s particular contribution to the Realist tradition
for Carr comprises four elements. The ﬁrst element is Spinoza’s belief that ‘practical
statesmen had contributed more to the understanding of politics than men of theory’.
This beneﬁt is attributable to the insights of statesmen being derived from experience
and hence useful in terms of practice, in contrast to the airy abstractions of men of
theory, philosophers, and theologians. The second element of Spinoza that Carr
identiﬁes as signiﬁcant is his emphasis on the laws of nature – that the human being
is a part of nature and obeys its laws like any other part. According to Carr, this
‘opens the door’ to determinism, that human behaviour obeys these iron laws in
a predictable manner. Spinoza, in Carr’s reading, establishes a theory where ‘ethics
become, in the last analysis, the study of reality’.8 The third element that Carr iden-
tiﬁes with Spinoza (and Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Hegel) is ‘the realist view that
no ethical standards are applicable to relations between states’.9 It is this absence of
ethical standards that Carr claims enabled Spinoza to argue that ‘states could not be
blamed for breaking faith; for everyone knew that other states would do likewise
if it suited their interests’.10 Stuart Hampshire sees this as the great advantage of
Spinoza’s approach to IR: ‘The strength of this form of political argument is that it
does not rest on changing and disputable moral notions, and can therefore be used
persuasively in all circumstances and at all times.’11 Carr’s ﬁnal explicit statement
on Spinoza is also related to the legal dimension of international relations in that
Spinoza, for Carr, purported to accept natural law but emptied it of meaning ‘by
virtually identifying it with the right of the stronger’.12
Carr’s reading of Spinoza is borne out by certain passages from his work. Spinoza
makes clear his appreciation of ‘that keen observer, Machiavelli’, and also his admira-
7 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 62.
8 Ibid., p. 63.
9 Ibid., p. 140.
10 Ibid., p. 146.
11 Stuart Hampshire, Spinoza and Spinozism, p. 141. Hampshire expands on this point later in the text:
‘To speak of ‘‘gratitude’’, ‘‘good faith’’ or ‘‘the sanctity of promises’’ in such contexts is only playing
with words; as it is impossible to expect any individual, to act in such a way as will clearly lead to its
own destruction of to the loss of its power’, p. 150.
12 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 161.
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tion of ‘that acute Florentine’.13 Spinoza is dismissive of theorists to an even greater
extent than Carr claims, denouncing their bewailing of human nature and denying
that they have anything useful to say on practical issues: ‘for the most part it is not
ethics that they have written, but satire; and they have never worked out a political
theory that can have practical application, only one that borders on fantasy or could
be put into effect in Utopia’.14 Carr is also correct in identifying as a theme in Spinoza’s
work the deterministic elements of Spinoza’s analysis of human behaviour: ‘he follows
the common order of Nature, and obeys it, and accommodates himself to it as far
as the nature of things demands’.15 The law of Nature is harsh in that ‘the law of
Nature forbids nothing at all except that which is not within anyone’s power to
do’.16 Spinoza expands on this theme in the Theological-Political Treatise:
From this it follows that Nature’s right and her established order, under which all men are
born and for the most part live, forbids only those things that no one desires and no one can
do; it does not frown on strife, or hatred, or anger, or deceit, nor on anything at all urged by
appetite. This is not surprising, for Nature’s bounds are set not by the laws of human reason
which aim only at man’s true interest and his preservation, but by inﬁnite other laws which
have regard to the eternal order of the whole of Nature, of which man is but a particle.17
It is because of the law of Nature that ‘sovereign power is bound by no law’, and that
right is coterminous not with any legal or moral reason, but with power.18 It is in this
context of recognising the primacy of power over law that Spinoza develops his ideas
about the permissibility of breaking faith with one’s allies. It is considerations of
power and interest that produce treaties rooted in calculations of ‘fear of loss or
hope of gain’ that only remain valid as long as those motives pertain. In the absence
of interest, ‘the tie by which the two commonwealths were bound together auto-
matically disintegrates’.19 It is in the fundamental realm of the preservation of self-
interest that treaties are conceived, executed, and ﬁnally dispensed with and a state
has ‘full right to break a treaty whenever it wishes, and it cannot be said to act
treacherously or perﬁdiously in breaking faith as soon as the reason for fear or hope
is removed’.20 Because sovereign right is rooted in power, no statesman can blame
another for jeopardising his state by breaking faith with him as the statesman should
13 Baruch/Benedict Spinoza, ‘Political Treatise’, Complete Works, ed. Michael L. Morgan, trans. Samuel
Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002), pp. 700, 747. As Edwin Curley writes, ‘Spinoza classes him, not
with the philosophers attacked in Political Treatise i.1, but with the politicians, who are praised in
Political Treatise i.2, for having learned from experience to anticipate the wicked conduct of men,
and for having, as a result, written successfully about human affairs’, ‘Kissinger, Spinoza and Genghis
Khan’, Cambridge Companion to Spinoza (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 329.
14 Spinoza, Political Treatise, p. 680.
15 Spinoza, ‘Ethics’, in Complete Works, ed. Michael L. Morgan, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis:
Hackett, 2002), p. 325.
16 Spinoza, Political Treatise, p. 688.
17 Spinoza, ‘Theological-Political Treatise’, in Complete Works, ed. Michael L. Morgan, trans. Samuel
Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002), p. 528.
18 Ibid., p. 530.
19 Spinoza, Political Treatise, p. 694. Balibar demonstrates the dynamics of this relationship by means of
a domestic analogy: ‘Only a superior power (for example, a sovereign who chooses to enforce respect
for commitments entered into by a law of the State) can, therefore, prevent contracts from being
broken when the interests which led them to be signed no longer exist (TP, II, 12–13). But if this power
sought to enforce such a law in a great many simultaneous cases it would thereby put its own power
at risk. The same is true of contracts made between States, save that in this case there is no superior
authority, and the decisive factor is therefore the interests of the parties involved.’ E´tienne Balibar,
Spinoza and Politics (London: Verso, 2008), p. 62.
20 Spinoza, Political Treatise, p. 694.
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not have entrusted his state’s security with the contracting party.21 At least in this
respect then, Carr is correct in his argument that Spinoza equates power and right.22
Spinoza beyond Carr
Carr’s representation of Spinoza is not inaccurate, but it is incomplete. Carr identiﬁes
certain aspects of Spinoza’s work, but he misses much of the systemic context in
which those elements are placed and from which they derive much of their meaning.
A possible reason for this incomplete picture is Carr’s overreliance on the Political
Treatise, an important, but unﬁnished text. Although the Political Treatise outlines
some elements of Spinoza’s political philosophy, it only reveals part of the whole of
his thought in these matters. Perhaps the most misleading element of Carr’s reading
of Spinoza is his claim that ethics is ultimately the ‘study of reality’ – it is more
accurate to state that Spinoza’s system begins with reality before considering the
means by which that reality could be ameliorated.23 Spinoza’s system is based on
confronting human nature in order to understand it, not to condemn it. For this
reason, the role of political theory is ‘to demonstrate by sure and conclusive reason-
ing such things as are in closest agreement with practice, deducing them from human
nature as it really is . . . not to deride, bewail, or execrate human actions, but to under-
stand them’.24
Politics as the Realm of Affect
In contrast to his overreliance on the Political Treatise, Carr neglected the Ethics.
This is surprising as the Ethics is the cornerstone of Spinoza’s philosophy. Carr seems
unaware that it is in the Ethics that Spinoza attempts to get to grips with the funda-
mental realities and deeper political logics that underpin the insights of the Political
Treatise. Spinoza’s focus in the Ethics is on the psychological and emotional founda-
tions of political life. David Lay Williams correctly identiﬁes the starting point of
Spinoza’s project as being the recognition that ‘human nature in a state of nature is
nothing more than a bundle of emotions’ that are dedicated to ‘self-preservation . . .
in myriad conﬂicting fashions . . . Thus, humankind’s natural condition is strife and
conﬂict.’25 It is in the Ethics that Spinoza claims it is his aim to bring geometric
reasoning to the understanding of these human emotions, ‘to treat of the nature and
strength of the emotions, and the mind’s power over them . . . and I shall consider
21 Ibid., p. 695.
22 Balibar expresses Spinoza’s task well in Spinoza and Politics: ‘Spinoza’s purpose here is not to justify
the notion of right, but to form an adequate idea of its determinations, of the way in which it works.
In this sense, his formula can be glossed as meaning that the individual’s right includes all that he is
effectively able to do and to think in a given set of conditions’, p. 59.
23 See Stuart Hampshire, Spinoza and Spinozism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), p. 138.
24 Spinoza, Political Treatise, p. 681. As Aurelia Armstrong writes, Spinoza’s signiﬁcance lies in the fact
that he thought against the grain of seventeenth-century rationalism, regarding the passional nature of
human beings as ‘the very ﬁeld of investigation upon which ethical and political theory must be
founded’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 17:2 (2009), p. 279.
25 David Lay Williams, ‘Spinoza and the General Will’, The Journal of Politics, 72:2 (April 2010), p. 342.
In Balibar’s concise articulation, ‘Sociability rooted in the passions is therefore necessarily conﬂictual.’
Spinoza and Politics, p. 112.
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human actions and appetites just as if it were an investigation in lines, planes, or
bodies’.26 Perhaps the central concept of the Spinozist enterprise is the conatus, the
psychological impetus or drive of an entity ‘by which [it] endeavours to persist in its
own being, [it] is nothing but the given, or actual essence of the thing’.27 Spinoza’s
thoughts on politics and ethics proceed from a philosophy of ﬂesh in that ‘the ﬁrst
thing that constitutes the essence of the mind is the idea of an actually existing
body, the basic and most important element of our mind is the . . . conatus to afﬁrm
the existence of our body’.28 It is this centrality of preserving the physical self that
drives political existence.29 Beyond the primary aim of survival the human being’s
life is predicated on pleasure and aversion to pain in all their myriad forms. This
pleasure/pain dichotomy ﬁnds its fundamental social and political expression in love
and hate:
If we imagine that someone is affecting with pleasure the object of our love, we shall be
affected with love toward him. If on the other hand we think that he is affecting with pain
the object of our love, we shall likewise be affected with hatred toward him.30
Within the realm of affect, the negative emotions of hatred and resentment are more
powerful than the positive emotions of love as they set in motion a system based on
the reciprocation of injury, to the extent that ‘it is evident that men are far more
inclined to revenge than to repay a beneﬁt.’31 The system perpetuates itself over the
generations leading to human beings being prone to hate and envy.32
To pain and pleasure must be added desire. Desire is a central concept of Spinoza’s
analysis of human behaviour because ‘[d]esire is the very essence of man.’ The inherent
problem with desire is the fact that it pulls the human being in all directions by virtue
of being divided against itself: ‘I mean by the word ‘‘desire’’ any of man’s endeavours,
urges, appetites, and volitions, which vary with man’s various states, and are not infre-
quently so opposed to one another that a man may be drawn in different directions
and know not where to turn.’33 Spinoza’s unﬂinching determination to get to the
roots of human existence provides an answer as to why the nature of politics is irra-
tional and prone to breakdown – the political, as a social interaction between human
beings, is not the realm of reason but rather the realm of the emotions and the affec-
tions. Utopian schemes of philosophers fail because they commit the category error
of mistaking the political realm for a rational sphere, but a reform that accepts the
current condition of human beings and is based on a sense of immanent unfolding
of reason and active affects is possible. Human political existence is caught between
the rival powers of passion and reason, which give rise to different rights, and rational
rights have no primacy, just an occasional and contingent sway over those of the
26 Spinoza, Ethics, p. 278.
27 Ibid., p. 283. Both the human conatus and the conatus of all things, animate and inanimate, share the
striving or tendency to persist in their own forms, but the human conatus is different in the sense that it
is also linked to speciﬁcally human attributes, for example, reason and appetite.
28 Spinoza, Ethics, p. 284.
29 According to Don Garrett, ‘The tendency towards self-preservation (perseverance in being) thus becomes,
a priori, an essential and deﬁning feature of the natures of all individual things, including all human
beings,’ Don Garrett, ‘Spinoza’s Ethical Theory’, in Don Garrett (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to
Spinoza (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 271.
30 Spinoza, Ethics, p. 290.
31 Ibid., p. 300.
32 Ibid., p. 307.
33 Ibid., pp. 311–12.
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passions: ‘these two rights are not symmetrical: if passion excludes and destroys
reason, reason does not in itself imply the destruction of every passion – it is merely
a superior power which dominates the passions’.34
Escaping the bondage of the emotions: the prescriptions of reason
Spinoza’s method is ﬁrst to identify the nature of life as the product of the emotional
impulses common to human beings and to confront the nature of politics as an activity
dominated by the desire for self-preservation and advancement of one’s interests, or
the interests of one’s group. Don Garrett has outlined the ultimate outcome of this
situation: ‘to the extent that human beings are not guided by reason, but are instead
subject to passions, they are contrary in nature, and liable to come into conﬂict with
one another’.35 It is only once this process of identiﬁcation has occurred that it is
possible to determine that the human being is at the mercy of his/her emotions, but
that these emotions can be checked, if never completely mastered, by reason. To
understand Spinoza it is necessary to recognise that there can be no escape from the
limits imposed by nature on the human being. Nature cannot be transcended or
tamed, improvement can only be a matter of seeking an accommodation between
our essential natures and the desire for rational political arrangements. Part of the
problem is that the conatus, inﬂuenced by appetite, has a ‘causal efﬁciency’ that
the human being only understands inadequately through the concepts of ends and
purpose.36 Spinoza’s project is to demonstrate that the conatus’ afﬁrmation of the
self can be put to more ordered and harmonious use by reason than that dictated by
the emotions.
The extent to which reason is dominated by nature, not vice versa, is evident from
Spinoza’s most concise expression of the relationship between the two:
Since reason demands nothing contrary to nature, it therefore demands that every man should
love himself, should seek his own advantage (I mean his real advantage), should aim at
whatever really leads a man toward greater perfection, and, to sum it all up, that each man,
as far as in him lies, should endeavour to preserve his own being. This is as necessarily true as
that the whole is greater than its part.37
The key terms here are the linked categories of ‘real advantage’, and ‘greater perfec-
tion’. Perfection for Spinoza lies in the power of activity – the freer an agent is to act
according to his or her (necessarily limited) power of self-determination, the greater
the degree of perfection he or she attains. To this end, Spinoza introduces a distinc-
tion between passive and active emotions – the former emerge in response to external
forces acting upon the human being, while the latter are the product of the conatus
to preserve the self. Human beings are active only insofar as they live under the
guidance of reason and the conatus of self-preservation. The active life is ‘good’ as
it is by being self-determined that the human being achieves a measure of freedom.
This observation is important in that it leads to an important distinction in Spinoza’s
34 Balibar, Spinoza and Ethics, p. 63.
35 Don Garrett, ‘Spinoza’s Ethical Theory’, p. 277. See also, Andrew Youpa, ‘Spinoza’s Theory of Moti-
vation’, Paciﬁc Philosophical Quarterly, 88 (2007), p. 387.
36 Andre Santos Campos, ‘The Individuality of the State in Spinoza’s Political Philosophy’, Archiv fu¨r
Geschichte Der Philosophie, 92:1 (2010).
37 Spinoza, Ethics, p. 338.
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work between fatalism and determinism. Human behaviour may be determined by
their causes, but these causes include the internal causes of reason and active emo-
tions in addition to the external factors that affect decision-making.38
It is at this point that Spinoza’s philosophy begins to differ from Carr’s represen-
tation of his work. By focusing on the Political Treatise, Carr sees only a half of
Spinoza’s project, that is, his articulation of the problem of politics as a sphere of
untrammelled desire for power. It is in the Ethics, which for whatever reason Carr
does not engage with, that Spinoza outlines his solution to this problem. While
recognising that ‘it is rarely the case that men live by the guidance of reason; their
condition is such that they are generally disposed to envy and mutual dislike’, none-
theless Spinoza argues that human beings ‘discover from experience that they can
much more easily meet their needs by mutual help and can ward off ever-threatening
perils only by joining forces’. Thus the human being’s true advantage is to cooperate
in as harmonious a manner as possible.
It is important to note that although Spinoza afﬁrms that the human being is a
natural entity, it is not reducible to an animal – the human being is a category of
nature sui generis and should be understood as such: ‘it is a much more excellent
thing and worthy of our knowledge to study the deeds of men than the deeds of
beasts’.39 According to Warren Montag, Spinoza considered the putative similarity
between the affects of humans and animals as contributing to the decline of human
freedom in that the human being’s ‘ belief that he is similar to the beasts is thus not
so much false in the sense that it does not accurately reﬂect the true state of affairs as
it is destructive of his being, of his power and pleasure’.40 Thus although as Nadler
argues, ‘[o]ntologically speaking there is nothing whatsoever that distinguishes a
human being from any other particular and determinate mode in nature’, the human
being is distinct psychologically and intellectually from those other modes.41
The power of reason allows the human being to create political life in addition
to nature’s laws. In this sense, Spinoza’s stress on a fairly brutal natural law is
contrasted with an alternative foundation for political life in reason. Spinoza’s ethics
revolve around accepting the natural, but carving a space for the development of
rational ethics. Curley identiﬁes Spinoza’s denial of a ‘transcendent standard of
justice’ by which to judge Genghis Khan’s actions, but also that: ‘this (challenging)
normative disclaimer does not imply that there is no other standard by which his
actions may be judged. For to say that Genghis Khan acts in accordance with natural
right is compatible with saying that he acts contrary to the law of reason . . . a
genuinely normative claim.’42 Reason therefore has ‘causal power’ in that it can
inﬂuence the mind to act in a manner consistent with true advantage as it is reason
that is in a position to determine what real advantage is.43
The positive part of Spinoza’s project therefore is concerned with ﬁnding an
ethics of virtue within the realm of affect. Although concepts of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are
meaningless in themselves they are nonetheless useful in developing an ethic within
38 Garrett, ‘Spinoza’s Ethical Theory’, p. 298.
39 Spinoza, Ethics, p. 338.
40 Warren Montag, ‘Imitating the Affects of Beasts: Interest and Inhumanity in Spinoza’, Differences: A
Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies, 20:2/3 (2009), p. 69.
41 Steven Nadler, Spinoza’s Ethics: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 122.
42 Curley, ‘Kissinger’, p. 322.
43 Donald Rutherford, ‘Spinoza and the Dictates of Reason’, Inquiry, 51:5 (2008), p. 496.
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the context of an all-encompassing nature.44 That which is good is identiﬁable as
such because it assists in promoting the development of Spinoza’s model of human
nature – the virtuous agent as the ‘man guided by reason’ who uses reason in order
to curb his desire for power and who through active emotional power can contribute
to social harmony. Conversely, ‘weakness’ in human beings is attributable to their
not being guided by reason, but by the passive emotions. Although the foundations
are relativist, Spinoza creates a normative perspective in which he directs agents
towards how they ought to act, that is, to gain their true advantage by acting in
accordance with reason and the fundamental conatus of self preservation.
Virtue in harmony
Determining ‘true’ advantage by the active use of reason produces a different political
logic to that of obeying the passive emotions that, as we have seen, produce an endless
cycle of hate and reciprocal injury. The basis of both virtue and happiness is self-
preservation and the means to achieve these ends lies in the creation of social
harmony:
Men, I repeat, can wish for nothing more excellent for preserving their own being than that
they should all be in such harmony in all respects that their minds and bodies should compose,
as it were, one mind and one body, and that all together should endeavour as best they can to
preserve their own being, and that all together should aim at the common advantage of all.45
To achieve this social harmony men have to surrender their natural rights – it is not
a natural harmony of interests and can only be preserved by the conscious use of
power ‘to prescribe common rules of behaviour and to pass laws to enforce them,
not by reason, which is incapable of checking the emotions . . . but by threats’.46
Within this social context anything that produces or contributes towards harmony is
advantageous and therefore good. It is for this reason that hate, the most powerful
of the passive emotions, can never be good because it is inherently divisive and pro-
duces discord. The man guided by reason therefore does not return hate to hate, but
instead tries ‘as far as he can to repay with love or nobility another’s hatred, anger,
contempt, etc. toward himself ’.47 Although difﬁcult given the lust for revenge, ‘it is
better to endure their injuries with patience, and to apply oneself to such measures
as promote harmony and friendship’.48
Despite Spinoza’s promotion of reason, he nonetheless recognises that the social
and political remain the realms of affect. Although he sees them as inherently prob-
lematic in themselves certain emotions are preferable to others. The ideal may ‘be to
be independent of hope, to free ourselves from fear, and to command fortune as far
as we can, and to direct our actions by the sure counsel of reason’, but this ideal is
44 ‘As for the terms ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘bad’’, they likewise indicate nothing positive in things considered in
themselves, and are nothing but modes of thinking, or notions which we form comparing things with
one another. For one and the same thing can be good and bad, and also indifferent.’ Spinoza, Ethics,
p. 321.
45 Spinoza, Ethics, p. 331. See in explanation of this David Lay Williams, ‘Spinoza and the General Will’,
pp. 341–56.
46 Spinoza Ethics, p. 341.
47 Ibid., p. 345.
48 Ibid., p. 360.
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unattainable: in order to counter strong passive emotions like hatred, emotions such
as hope and fear are required.49 In this sense hope and fear represent the emotions of
the lesser evil, thus although not good in themselves, they become good by comparison
with hate and pride.50 It is not enough to act out of fear and hope passively, however,
these emotions should be directed by reason to effective ends. A human being is freer
when reason directs the emotions and not vice versa. The (as Spinoza admits, un-
achievable) ideal is that ‘if men could be guided by reason, all desire that arises
from passive emotion would be ineffective’.51 The key then to achieving an ethical
dimension within political life is that those charged with political responsibility:
should pay particular attention to getting to know each emotion, as far as possible, clearly and
distinctly, so that the mind may thus be determined from the emotion to think those things
that it clearly and distinctly perceives, and in which it ﬁnds full contentment. Thus the emotion
may be detached from the thought of an external cause and joined to true thoughts. The result
will be that not only are love, hatred, etc., destroyed . . . but also that the appetites or desires
that are wont to arise from such an emotion cannot be excessive.52
The positive element of Spinoza’s project then is a programme of using reason to
curb the passions, to enable the individual to assume a more dispassionate perspec-
tive on politics:
if we always have in readiness consideration of our true advantage and also of the good that
follows from mutual friendship and social relations, and also remember that supreme content-
ment of spirit follows from the right way of life (Pr. 52, IV), and that men, like everything else,
act from the necessity of their nature, then the wrong, or the hatred that is wont to arise from
it, will occupy just a small part of our imagination and will easily be overcome.53
This perspective, however, is not something that can be achieved on a universal basis,
in which case the best that can be achieved is to foster the joyful emotions, which may
perhaps serve the purpose of increasing ‘our powers of thinking and acting, bringing
us to the brink of adequate understanding and action’.54 Spinoza is quite clear that
the man guided by reason is distinct from ‘the multitude’ that does not ﬁnd freedom
in checking emotions and following reason, but rather the individuals who compose
it ‘think that they are free to the extent that they can indulge their lusts’.55 In contrast
to the blessedness of the man guided by reason, the multitude can only be induced to
obey the commands of reason by means of fear and hope. Viewed from Spinoza’s
perspective then political life follows one of two paths. The ﬁrst is to act according
49 Spinoza, Ibid., p. 346.
50 Balibar: ‘Individual reason by itself is too weak and must therefore always have recourse to passions
that are bad in themselves (that is, are causes of sadness, such as glory, ambition, humility, and so
on). In this way, one affect can be used to overcome another’, Spinoza and Politics, p. 96. Pride is
particularly complex in Spinoza’s analysis of emotions. Excessive pride, in either exultation of one’s
own value or self-abasement, is especially problematic, while some positives may be found in ‘ordinary’
pride.
51 Spinoza, Ethics, p. 351.
52 Ibid., p. 366.
53 Ibid., p. 369.
54 Aurelia Armstrong, ‘Natural and Unnatural Communities’, p. 303. For Genevieve Lloyd, ‘In under-
standing the passions we do not merely exercise an enjoyable intellectual power which leaves the
passions themselves unchanged. This understanding transforms the passions into active, rational emo-
tions – the source of freedom and virtue.’ Genvieve Lloyd, Spinoza and the Ethics (London: Routledge,
1996), p. 72.
55 Spinoza, Ethics, p. 381.
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to the natural inclinations and the reciprocal politics of hate and conﬂict driven by
the emotional motors of anger, revenge, greed, and resentment. The second is to
seek what Spinoza regards as the rationally derived true advantage of harmony and
mutual interest – to check the emotions, not to surrender to them. The fundamental
purpose of politics is to create conditions wherein those who are not guided by
reason are coerced or seduced to act as if they were.56 For Spinoza, the role of
the intellectual is to instruct as many people as possible to seek the second path:
‘nowhere can each individual display the extent of his skill and genius more than in
so educating men that they come at last to live under the sway of their own reason’.57
The deeper Spinozism of Carr’s morality
In a manner similar to Spinoza, one of Carr’s primary aims was the education of
his readers, in various target audiences, including his former diplomatic colleagues,
Marxist intellectuals and the general public, about the intricacies of global politics.58
The brief chapter of The Twenty Years’ Crisis entitled ‘The Limitations of Realism’
is very useful in understanding the nature of Carr’s theory of international morality
in the context of Spinoza’s philosophy. It is in this chapter that Carr argues that
‘[t]he impossibility of being a consistent and thorough-going realist is one of the
most certain and most curious lessons of political science.’ This impossibility is
rooted in what Carr argues are four elements he judges ‘to be essential ingredients
of all effective political thinking’ and that are missing from ‘pure’ Realism: ‘a ﬁnite
goal, an emotional appeal, a right of moral judgment and a ground for action’.59
These criteria of evaluation lead to an odd conclusion of wider signiﬁcance in terms
of Carr’s understanding of Realism, that Realism is divisible into two types – an
adulterated but useful Realism that has the potential to inform policy in a progressive
manner, and a pure Realism that ultimately leads to crippling cynicism.
In relation to ﬁnite goals it has to be admitted that Spinoza does not offer a target
or telos in the shape of an endpoint of history or a promised land. This is not to
argue, however, that Spinoza does not offer a goal. Spinoza’s goal is both limited
and inﬁnite – limited in the sense that its bounds are determined by the internal and
external constraints imposed on the human being by nature, but inﬁnite in the sense
that Spinoza’s goal, the reformation of human political psychology, can extend to
the furthest part of the human future. Spinoza offers a reform of the logic of human
interaction not of particular forms, processes, systems, or structures – any such reform
would be incidental to the fundamental reform of political mentalities.
This prospect of the reform of political psychology does, however, have an emo-
tional appeal, speciﬁcally in a Spinozist sense, an active emotional appeal. Spinoza
denies the emotional appeal of Utopia and instead posits the achievement of political-
psychological reform as a rational end for those capable of perceiving it as such, but
56 Balibar, Spinoza and Politics, p. 94.
57 Spinoza, Ethics, p. 359.
58 Charles Jones, E. H. Carr and International Relations: A Duty to Lie (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998), pp. 46–65. On Carr’s use of rhetoric see Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little,
The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press,
1993), pp. 206–8. See also Peter Wilson, ‘Radicalism for a Conservative Purpose: The Peculiar Realism
of E. H. Carr’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 30:1 (2001), p. 134.
59 E. H. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 84.
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also holding the emotions of hope and fear in reserve for those who can or will not
perceive it as such. As demonstrated in the foregoing sections, Spinoza is perhaps the
ﬁnest philosopher of the emotions in the Western tradition, acutely aware of the
powerful appeal of emotions in both their negative and positive capacities to produce
effects in political and social life.
Spinoza also offers a right of moral judgment in that he links moral reason with
the conatus of self-interest. Spinoza’s moral judgment is based on the distinction
between ‘true advantage’ deriving from cooperation and working towards harmony
derived from reason, experience, and the conatus for self-interest and the apparent
advantage of short term aggrandisement at the expense of others derived from greed,
hate, or resentment (the passive emotions). Although Spinoza recognises that in a
state of nature to act solely according to appetite is appropriate in that context, and
that the agent cannot be condemned as such, it is preferable, but not always achiev-
able, to live according to reason.60
Carr considered the ultimate shortcoming of ‘consistent’ realism to be its failure
to offer ‘any ground for purposive or meaningful action . . . if our thought is irrevo-
cably conditioned by our status and our interests, then both action and thought
become devoid of purpose’.61 Spinoza’s position on this point is complicated by his
twofold thought in relation to determinism. It is the case that Spinoza considered
the human being to be determined by his environment as a particle of nature, yet,
he also argues that the human being ought to resist those forces that determine him
passively, by instead embracing the determination of active emotions and reason.
Spinoza then afﬁrms determinism, but counsels that the grounds of determination
should be derived from the individual’s intellect and positive affects as far as possible.62
In terms of providing a ground for action, Spinoza is probably guilty of Carr’s
charge in that he does not provide any speciﬁc advice on how statesmen should act
other than in the context of his existence within and outside the bondage of the
emotions. This perspective, however, is not the plane on which Spinoza acts. Spinoza
is operating at the political psychological level – seeking to address the deeper,
pathological aspects of human behaviour. Spinoza’s work is not in this sense devoid
of purpose but the purpose cannot be restricted to any set of proposals as to how the
international system may be improved, rather he is trying to break the logic of hate
and the cycle of recrimination at source – the cause rather than the effect of interna-
tional discord. Spinoza accepts what is, but strives for what ought to be – it is in this
sense that Spinoza is an ethical thinker.
Spinoza then does not conform to Carr’s model of consistent realism. This failure
to achieve the status of pure realism is, however, a positive from Carr’s perspective as
he draws a clear distinction between ‘pure realism’ and ‘realists who have left their
mark on history’. It is this latter category (which includes Machiavelli, Marx, and
60 Spinoza, Tractatus Theolgico-Politicus, pp. 327–34.
61 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 86.
62 Garrett puts this in the context of a contrast between determinism and fatalism: ‘Spinoza is not a fatalist.
For although he holds that all volitions, behaviors, and other events are completely determined by
their causes, he does not deny that volitions are among the causes of behavior, nor that behaviors are
sometimes among the causes of other events . . . Spinoza, is, however, a necessitarian; he does hold that
everything true is true necessarily. One aspect of his necessitarianism is his determinism: that is, his
acceptance of the doctrine that the total state of the universe at any given time plus the laws of nature
jointly determine the total state of the universe at any future time.’ ‘Spinoza’s Ethical Theory,’ p. 298.
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Lenin) of what may be called an ‘impure’, plural, or hetero-realism that Carr identi-
ﬁes as useful in contrast to a pure realism that ‘can offer nothing but a naked struggle
for power which makes any kind of international society impossible’.63 Arguably, the
whole chapter exists in order to introduce this distinction between two forms of
Realism, with Carr clearly aligning his own moral theory with those Realists who
have made their mark on history.64 Viewed within this context, Carr’s parallels with
Spinoza become more apparent.
Carr’s ethics of the ‘ordinary man’ – power/right equivalence and the social morality
of group persons
Carr’s ﬁrst move in his ethics is exactly the same as Spinoza’s, that is, the denial of
the signiﬁcance of the moral code of the philosopher. Carr then introduces a stalking
horse, ‘the ordinary man’, a ﬁgure with attitudes markedly similar to Spinoza’s practi-
cal statesman. Throughout his analysis of international morality Carr makes Spinozist
or Spinoza-like claims and arguments. The most signiﬁcant of these concern the
distinction between individual morality and state morality and Carr’s awareness of
the role of emotions within International Relations.
Carr’s employment of ‘the ordinary man’ and ‘most people’ allows him to state
Spinozist principles such as ‘most people, while believing that states ought to act
morally, do not expect of them the same kind of moral behaviour which they expect
of themselves and one another . . . International morality is another category with
standards which are in part peculiar to itself.’65 The Spinozist recognition of the
primacy of self-interest is also recognised by Carr, ‘the duty of the group person
appears by common consent to be more limited by self-interest than the duty of the
individual . . . The group person is not commonly expected to indulge in altruism at
the cost of any serious sacriﬁce of its interests.’66 The distinction between individual
and state morality is made clear by Carr by reference to the relativity of values in a
Spinozist argument about the unﬁxed nature of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ acts: ‘the ordinary
man . . . expects from the group person certain kinds of behaviour which he would
deﬁnitely regard as immoral in the individual. The group is not only exempt from
some of the moral obligations of the individual, but is deﬁnitely associated with
pugnacity and self-assertion, which become positive virtues of the group person.’67
Carr provides an example of this peculiar moral character of group persons by refer-
ence to the behaviour of the Great Powers as they engage in espionage, an activity
that involves deceit, theft and occasionally violence:
No stigma attaches to ‘Great Britain’ or ‘Germany’ for acting in this manner; for such
practices are believed to be common to all the Great Powers, and a state which did not resort
to them might ﬁnd itself at a disadvantage. Spinoza argued that states would do likewise if it
suited their interest. One reason why a higher standard of morality is not expected of states is
because states in fact frequently fail to behave morally and because there are no means of
compelling them to do so.68
63 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 87.
64 See Charles Jones, E. H. Carr: A Duty to Lie, pp. 53–4.
65 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 143.
66 Ibid., p. 144.
67 Ibid., p. 145.
68 Ibid., p. 146.
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As a group person acting within a limited ‘social morality’ what the state can achieve
is circumscribed by its circumstances. In a manner practically identical to Spinoza,
Carr insists on a power/right equivalence, ﬁnding international society’s rights to be
intrinsically linked with the power of leading states:
The trouble is not that Guatemala’s rights and privileges are only proportionately, not abso-
lutely, equal to those of the United States, but that such rights and privileges as Guatemala has
are enjoyed only by the good will of the United States. The constant intrusion, or potential
intrusion, of power renders almost meaningless any conception of equality between members
of the international community.69
It is the patent lack of equality between states, or the presence of a higher authority
that makes international law an inadequate basis for achieving international morality.
Like Spinoza, Carr is sceptical towards international law, and sees it as a second
order instrument of power:
Society cannot live by law alone, and law cannot be the supreme authority . . . Every system of
law presupposes an initial political decision, whether explicit or implied, whether achieved by
voting or by bargaining or by force, as to the authority entitled to make and unmake law.
Behind all law there is this necessary political background. The ultimate authority of law
derives from politics.70
It is this reasoning that leads Carr to assert that any ‘international moral order must
rest on some hegemony of power’.71 Legal institutions and processes without genuine
power for Carr are merely blind alleys from which we have to extricate ourselves.72
Carr and the emotions
Carr’s focus on power/morality equivalence is not the only major feature that he
shares with Spinoza. Carr is also deeply concerned with the role of the emotions in
the conduct of international relations and their impact on the moral realm and the
prospects for peaceful change. Carr’s criticism of Realism, that it does not allow
for the ‘emotional, irrational appeal’ of ﬁnite goals, is extended in the chapter on
international morality into a Spinozist concern with the affective realm of emotions.
In general, Carr recognises ‘the initial difﬁculty’ of ascribing emotions, ‘which play a
large part in individual morality’ to states, but he argues that states and other group
actors can and do act compassionately:
we do, in certain circumstances, expect states and other group persons, not merely to comply
with their formal obligations, but to behave generously and compassionately. And it is precisely
this expectation which produces moral behaviour on behalf of a ﬁctitious entity like a bank or a
state . . . states make compassionate grants because public opinion expects it of them. The moral
impulse may be traced back to individuals. But the moral act is the act of the group person.73
In a manner similar to Spinoza, emotions underpin the moral frameworks of political
life for Carr: ‘Loyalty to the group comes to be regarded as a cardinal virtue of the
individual’, even when this is problematic in that it ‘may require him to condone
69 Ibid., p. 149.
70 Ibid., p. 166.
71 Ibid., p. 151.
72 Ibid., p. 189.
73 Ibid., p. 144.
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behaviour by the group person which he would condemn in himself ’.74 Such is the
emotional power of the state that it ‘demands from the individual a far more inten-
sive loyalty and far graver sacriﬁces’.75 A further complication of emotions is that
they prevent any form of universal identiﬁcation based on common membership of
humanity. There are, for Carr, layers of intimacy that allow those closest to us
greater standing in our decision making: ‘Most men’s sense of common interest and
obligation is keener in respect of family and friends than in respect of others of their
fellow-countrymen, and keener in respect of their fellow-countrymen than of other
people . . . We all apply, consciously or unconsciously, some such standard of relative
values.’76 One of the primary contributing factors to the persistence of the weakness
of international society is the emotional pull of loyalty to the nation.77
Appeasement as the culmination of power and emotion
Both of Carr’s Spinozist themes combine in relation to what he calls peaceful change,
which ﬁnds its most controversial expression in Carr’s advocacy of appeasement.78
Appeasement for Carr makes sense in terms of accommodating the interests and
power of the ‘have’ and ‘have-not’ powers in that it allows the satiated powers to
retain their hegemony of power within the system, while also recognising the claims
of revisionist powers. In Spinozist terms, appeasement of this kind would represent
the achievement of the ‘true advantage’ of both parties. The period of the twenty
years’ crisis itself is framed in a Spinozist logic of the primacy of power and self-
interest and the weakness of law to achieve any measure of effective justice. The
Spinozist logic of the lesser evil is clear from one of the deleted passages from the ﬁrst
edition:
If the power relations of Europe in 1938 made it inevitable that Czecho-Slovakia should lose
part of her territory, and eventually her independence, it was preferable (quite apart from any
question of justice or injustice) that this should come about as the result of discussions round a
table in Munich rather than as the result of a war between the Great Powers or of a local war
between Germany and Czecho-Slovakia.79
This passage allows us to distinguish Carr’s ethics from an ethic based on the
primacy of justice – his (and Spinoza’s) ethics do not revolve around justice, but
rather on the preservation of one’s own community and international order – this
is not the realm of ﬁat justitia, pereat mundus. Spinoza and Carr are clearly more
concerned with an ethics of adjustment than with the delineation and execution of
claims to justice. Carr also undermines the claims of justice by arguing that the issue
of justice is ‘the question that immediately exercises the minds’ of those faced with
a demand for change, but that this concept is in itself viewed through the prism of
74 Ibid., p. 144.
75 Ibid., p. 145.
76 Ibid., p. 148.
77 Ibid., p. 150.
78 For the contemporary context and long-term disciplinary impact of Carr’s support for appeasement,
see Ian Hall, ‘Power Politics and Appeasement: Political Realism in British International Thought,
1935–1955’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 8:2 (2006).
79 Quoted in Michael Cox, ‘From the First to the Second Editions of The Twenty Years’ Crisis: A Case of
Self-Censorship?’, Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. lxxvi.
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interest, which colours and maybe even wholly determines it.80 It is signiﬁcant that
Carr explicitly ties his project to ‘hope’ – one of Spinoza’s more acceptable emotions –
that the dissatisﬁed powers will become satisﬁed by the self-interested sacriﬁce of the
satisﬁed powers and the rational adjustment of international society. This sort of
calculation demonstrates, as Peter Wilson has claimed, that ‘Carr was not ‘‘running
away from the notion of good’’ so much as pointing out that ‘‘good’’ was a good
deal more complicated than many people made it out to be.’81
The Spinozist focus on affect is particularly present in Carr’s identiﬁcation of the
problems of international relations as attributable to an underdeveloped ‘common
feeling between nations’ and it is this lack of emotional sense that played a major
contributory role in the failure to achieve a genuine peace with Germany after the
war. Such community as existed in international society was ‘torn asunder by the War,
when malice and all uncharitableness became the watchwords of every belligerent’,
leaving ‘a legacy of hatred’ in its wake.82 In Britain: A Study in Foreign Policy, Carr
makes clear the impact of the frenzied indignation of the combatants in poisoning
relations in its aftermath: ‘These emotions could not be suddenly extinguished at the
signing of the armistice; and they exercised a dominant inﬂuence on the terms of the
peace treaties.’83 These emotions, further stirred up by statesmen eager to avoid
domestic social unrest were projected onto the defeated enemy or the Soviet Union,
with the effect that these statesmen, ‘were now in large measure their captives’.84
This emotional context has to be seen in the wider Spinozist sense of Germany’s
lack of power to gain its rights:
Unfortunately, Germany was almost wholly deﬁcient for ﬁfteen years after 1918 in that power
which is, as we have seen, a necessary motive force in political change; and this deﬁciency
prevented effect being given, except on a minor scale, to the widespread consensus of opinion
that parts of the Versailles Treaty ought to be modiﬁed. By the time Germany regained her
power, she had adopted a completely cynical attitude about the role of morality in interna-
tional politics.85
The tragedy of the interbellum was that had a certain amount of emotional intelli-
gence been employed by the satiated powers, instead of Clemenceau’s vindictive
desire for punishment and the attribution of guilt, powerful passive emotions, then
the German polity would not in turn have succumbed to the Nazis, who cynically
exploited the emotions of the Germans and who displayed a blatant disregard for
the standards of civilisation.86 In contrast to Stresemann, who ‘had ignored the hate-
80 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 199.
81 Peter Wilson, ‘Carr and his Early Critics: Responses to The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1939–1946’, in
Michael Cox (ed.), E. H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), p. 187.
82 Carr, ‘Honour Among Nations’, Fortnightly (May 1939), p. 499.
83 E. H. Carr, Britain: A Study of Foreign Policy from the Versailles Treaty to the Outbreak of War
(London: Longmans, Green, 1939), p. 148.
84 E. H. Carr, ‘The Versailles Fiasco’, Times Literary Supplement (6 June 1968), p. 565.
85 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 201.
86 In his account of his time as a member of the British delegation to the Treaty of Versailles, Carr
records, ‘I was outraged by French intransigence and by our [the British] unfairness to the Germans,
whom we cheated over the ‘‘Fourteen Points’’ and subjected to every petty humiliation.’ E. H. Carr,
‘An Autobiography’, in Cox, E. H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal, p. xvi. Carr here reﬂects a common
belief at the time, perhaps best exempliﬁed by John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of
the Peace (London: Macmillan, 1919) that Germany had been subject to a vindictive and punitive
peace. Margaret Macmillan argues that this common perception was mistaken, that the Treaty was
not vindictive and, in particular, it was not harshly enforced. Margaret Macmillan, The Peacemakers:
The Paris Conference of 1919 and its Attempt to End War (London: John Murray, 2001).
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complex in German politics in the hope that it would gradually dissolve unnoticed.
Hitler recognised it’, and oriented his policies accordingly.87 After the rise to power
of the Nazis, the cycle of hate and recrimination asserted its grip on all the partici-
pants, with a newly empowered Germany dismantling by force and confrontation of
the system that had been imposed upon it by the victorious powers, destroying ‘the
limited stock of common feeling which had formerly existed’.88
Carr’s advocacy of appeasement demonstrates his Spinozist understanding of
the international society in that it was a policy prescription based on a clinically
detached analysis of power within that system. The purpose of appeasement was
to break the cycle of hatred, violence, and recrimination by a combination of self-
interest and an awareness of the need to balance hate and anger with a dispassionate,
rational response.89 Unfortunately, in Hitler and the Nazis political reality found the
ultimate expression of politics as lust for revenge and destruction – afﬁrming Spinoza
and Carr’s analysis of the problem of politics as an emotional and irrational activity
rooted in the desire for power and highlighting the limitations of their solutions
based in the power of reason. Carr and Neville Chamberlain, both ‘men guided by
reason’ in the Spinozist sense, found their attempts at securing or promoting a realistic
peace overwhelmed by individuals in thrall to the passive emotions. In his autobio-
graphical sketch written to Tamara Deutscher, Carr reﬂected on his failure to assess
accurately the danger of Nazi Germany – ‘I don’t think it was till 1938, after the
occupation of Austria, that I began to think of Hitler as a serious danger. No doubt
I was very blind.’ Carr attributed this blindness to his own indignation at the terms
of the Treaty of Versailles and initially viewed Hitler’s actions as ‘rectiﬁcation of
an old injustice’.90 Carr’s ultimate verdict on appeasement was that it failed not in
principle, but in execution, as it was merely one part of a fatally ﬂawed foreign policy
that in its various aspects ultimately succeeded in alienating both Germany and the
USSR:
I began to take notice of rumours of secret contacts between Moscow and Berlin, and to
ﬁnd them plausible. It seemed to me folly for the British Government to pursue a line which
antagonised both. As I became less inclined to appease Hitler, I became more inclined to
appease Stalin. I remember seeing the guarantee of 1 April 1939, to Poland as the ﬁnal recipe
for disaster. We could not possibly implement it except in alliance with Russia and it was given
in such a way as to preclude any such agreement.91
Carr is here arguing in Spinozist terms that the failure of appeasement was due to the
British not thinking correctly about the nature of international politics and alliance
formation. This in turn was caused by British foreign policy being divided into two
camps – ‘one recommending an attitude of ﬁrmness and intransigence in all dealings
with Germany, the other an attitude of conciliation and concession . . . It was perhaps
87 John Hallett (E. H. Carr), ‘The Prussian Complex,’ Fortnightly Review (1 Jan 1933), p. 43.
88 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 201.
89 ‘Was it not possible’, wrote Carr in Britain: A Study in Foreign Policy, ‘by substituting a consistent
policy of conciliation and concession – which had never yet been tried – for one of intransigence and
criticism, to bring about a de´tente with one or more of the potentially hostile powers?’, p. 167.
90 Carr, ‘An Autobiography’, p. xix in Michael Cox, E. H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal (Basingstoke:
Palgrave, 2001). The mistreatment of the Germans in the Treaty of Versailles is one of the few instances
in his work where justice plays an important role – and this is as much a question of political mis-
management as moral critique.
91 E. H. Carr, ‘An Autobiography’, p. xix. Carr believed that the only tangible success of appeasement
was that it kept the Italians out of the war – at least at the beginning.
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the main cause of the chronic indecision and consequent bankruptcy of British policy
in Central Europe after 1919 that neither view rallied sufﬁcient support to prevail
for any length of time over the other.’92 The situation was further compromised by
Britain’s refusal to engage in serious negotiations with the Soviet Union. By ruling
out alliance with the Soviets, the British effectively endangered their own safety –
ignoring the fundamental task of statecraft, which is to ensure peace and security by
means of prioritising self-interest over disgust at the questionable values of one’s
potential allies, at least until such time as the immediate danger has passed.
Ethics versus morality in Spinoza and Carr
Gilles Deleuze makes an important distinction between ethics and morality in Spinoza’s
work that can be extended to that of Carr. The difference between morality and ethics
lies in their fundamental purposes: morality, based on transcendent values is a ‘system
of Judgment’, derived from a concept of God as judge employing a series of eternal
and timeless laws to a subject population.93 Ethics is quite distinct in that it is predi-
cated on an ‘ethical test’, which instead of being concerned with restoring a moral
order, or applying a judgment derived from that order, ‘conﬁrms, here and now, the
immanent order of essences and their states. Instead of a synthesis that distributes
rewards and punishments the ethical test is content with analyzing our chemical
composition (the test of gold or clay).’94 In other words, the ethical test is concerned
with whether an action has value or is worthless in any given situation. According
to Deleuze the ‘ethical question falls then, in Spinoza, into two parts: How can we
come to produce active affections? But ﬁrst of all: How can we come to experience a
maximum of joyful passions?’95 To put this in other terms, how to break the strangle-
hold of the hateful passions and replace them with something more positive? This
leads to a distinction between an ethics based on determining good and bad things,
as opposed to a morality based on ﬁxed categories of Good and Evil. This is crucial
because a ‘distinction between good things and bad provides the basis for a real
ethical difference, which we must substitute for a false moral opposition’.96 The
good then equates with the advantageous – which leads to a human and social concept
of ‘the good’:
And if it be asked what is most useful to us, this will be seen to be man. For man in principle
agrees in nature with man; man is absolutely or truly useful to man. Everyone, then, in seeking
what is truly useful to him, also seeks what is useful to man. The effort to organize encounters
is thus ﬁrst of all the effort to form an association of men in relations that can be combined.97
Ethics then is about encounters and relations – good encounters and relations pro-
duce positive affects and lend themselves to order and harmony, evil or bad, by con-
trast, ‘is always a bad encounter, evil is always the decomposition of a relation’.98
92 E. H. Carr, Britain: A Study in Foreign Policy, p. 149.
93 Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (San Francisco: City Lights, 1988), p. 23.
94 Ibid., p. 41.
95 Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza (New York: Zone Books, 1992), p. 246, emphasis
in original.
96 Ibid., p. 254.
97 Deleuze, Expressionism, p. 261.
98 Ibid., p. 247, emphasis in original.
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This theme of decomposition of relations reﬂects perfectly Carr’s analysis of the
ethical situation in Europe between the wars. In this light, appeasement is an ethical
attempt to come to terms with the decomposition of European international society,
as evidenced by Carr’s defence of the British negotiators at Munich:
From ﬁrst to last, neither the British Government nor Lord Runciman advocated cession or
any other solution on its own merits. They were concerned as mediators to work for whatever
solution offered the possibility of preserving peace; and both eventually came to the conclusion
that cession was the only solution which satisﬁed that condition.99
In this sense, the commitment to peace is an ethical as opposed to a moral decision.
As Michael Cox argues, Carr was not a ‘blind enthusiast’ for appeasement for the
sake of appeasement, once it was clear that it failed as a policy in relation to Hitler,
Carr moved on.100
Although he uses the terms ethics and morality interchangeably, in Spinozist
terms, Carr is producing an ethics of IR, and in doing so providing a critique of
the pretensions of liberal morality, which according to Carr, transforms ‘a conﬂict
between the desiderata of different nations into a moral conﬂict between Good and
Evil, which has helped so much to embitter international relations at the present
time’.101 Carr does not sit in judgment of Germany, or even Hitler.102 Throughout
his analyses of Germany in the 1930s, his aim is to analyse the cause of the problem
and to seek the means to remedy it. The problem for Carr has two causes, ﬁrst the
very application of the victors’ will to judgement compelling the Germans, ‘to sub-
scribe to the most ruthless and sweeping moral condemnation in history’ which
exacerbated the other cause, Germany’s sense of inferiority.103 The moral indigna-
tion of the victors blinded them to the true advantage of incorporating Germany
into international society early and effectively, which would have been to the true
advantage of all parties, instead, various parties in Britain and France were deter-
mined to punish Germany and render her a pariah, with the result being the ‘admis-
sion of Germany to the League of Nations was bungled. Between 1926 and 1929 no
serious attempt was made to remedy German grievances. These were the years of
wasted opportunity, when willingness to meet Germany’s still modest claims might
have produced real appeasement.’104 By not dealing with Stresemann (a man guided
by reason), the allies in effect paved the way for Hitler (a man guided by his passions)
as the Germans, ‘drew the inevitable conclusion that force was the only method of
breaking the fetters of Versailles; the Weimar Republic toppled to its fall’.105
The appeasement of Hitler for Carr was an attempt to stave off the consequences
of acting according to the passive emotions and a morality that contributed in no
99 E. H. Carr, ‘Hostile Views of Munich. A Polemic and a Record’ (review of R. W. Seton-Watson,
Munich and the Dictators), Times Literary Supplement (11 March 1939), p. 142.
100 Michael Cox, ‘Introduction’, Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. xxvii.
101 E. H. Carr, ‘Honour Among Nations: A Critique of International Cant’, The Fortnightly (May 1939),
p. 492.
102 In ‘Impressions of a Visit to Russia and Germany’, Carr writes that he did not ‘think it any use to talk
of the wickedness of one side of the other, whether Hitler is wickeder than Stalin or the converse is
true. The question of personal wickedness and good and bad fairies can be left to the fairy tale school
of history which I hope is, today, nearly extinct.’ quoted in Jonathan Haslam, The Vices of Integrity,
p. 78.
103 Hallett/Carr, ‘The Prussian Complex’, p. 40.
104 Carr, Britain: A Study in Foreign Policy, p. 152.
105 Ibid., p. 153.
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small measure to his rise. The period 1933–9 reveals most starkly the connection
between power and ethics. For Carr, a largely disarmed and economically weakened
Britain simply could not have engaged in a policy of confrontation with Germany, in
Spinozist terms, it lacked the power to enforce any right to do so as ‘down to 1938,
the armament situation made a policy of conciliation the only practical one. The
alternative was a policy of hostile words which could not be reinforced by military
action.’106
Conclusion
It is clear that Paul Rich is correct in his assessment that The Twenty Years’ Crisis
represents, ‘a plea for a rethinking of the moral purpose of international politics’,107
yet the failure of appeasement as a policy provokes a question – ‘what remains
worthwhile in the ethical and political theories of Carr and, by extension, Spinoza?’
The answer may be found in a distinction between analysis and prescription.
The problem with both Carr and Spinoza lies not with their diagnoses of the
problems of IR and ethics, but rather with their prescriptions. Both authors recognise
the weakness of reason in relation to the natural drives and impulses of human beings,
yet neither can resist the temptation to make reason the basis of their attempts to re-
strain impulse and emotion.108 It is in this sense that both are open to the criticism
that Morgenthau makes of Carr, that his was a ‘mind which has discovered the
phenomenon of power and longs to transcend it’.109 Morgenthau goes on to argue
that Carr, lacking a transcendent point outside politics, cannot but fail in his synthesis
of realism and utopianism.110
Morgenthau, however, overstates the case for Carr’s failure. Carr himself antici-
pates Morgenthau style criticism of appeasement: ‘there is a common inclination in
politics to take the deterministic view that any policy which fails was bound to fail
and should, therefore, never have been tried’. The simple facts of the matter for
Carr precluded a politics of confronting Hitler:
British opinion had long ago recognised that the military restrictions, the demilitarisation of
the Rhineland and the separation of Austria from Germany could not be maintained indeﬁnitely
and that the only issue was the date and manner of their disappearance; and one of the most
obvious factors in the crisis of September 1938 was that Britain would not ﬁght to maintain a
106 Ibid., p. 176. Carr’s analysis largely chimes with but ultimately departs from that of contemporary
historians such as Richard Overy in that Overy argues that Britain could not have realistically fought
a war much earlier than 1939, where they differ is in the question of preparing for war: in The Road to
War, Overy uncovers evidence that Britain had begun to plan for war with Germany as early as 1934.
Britain’s rearmament programme envisaged 1939 as the year in which it would reach peak prepared-
ness: a war before this date would be fought with inadequate weapons, a war fought much after this
date would be conducted at a disadvantage as the German capacity for war would reach its peak in
the early 1940s. For Overy, Munich was conducted in the hope that Hitler might be satisﬁed with the
Sudetenland, but it was also an attempt to stall for time in order to enable the ﬁnal phases of war
preparedness.
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108 Carr was later to restate the limits of reason’s ability to curtail the passions: ‘exhortations to human
beings to behave rationally and not emotionally, like exhortations to love one another, are liable to
fall on deaf ears.’ E. H. Carr, ‘Conﬂicts of Interest’, (Review of Erich Fromm, May Man Prevail?)
Times Literary Supplement (21 September 1962), p. 745.
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Czechoslovak state which, in a population of 14,000,000 contained 3,250,000 Germans and
other large and disloyal minorities. It cannot be charged to the policy of conciliation that these
concessions were made. The only ground for criticism is that they were not made in other
conditions and at an earlier date.111
Even if we allow that both Carr and Spinoza’s prescriptions are either unsuccessful
or vague, their analytical insights into the dynamics of power and ethics in political
life remain valuable to the study of international politics.112 The primary advantage
of engaging with these authors lies in the extent to which they provide signiﬁcant
insights into understanding political existence and the nature and limits of global ethics.
When read in tandem, Carr and Spinoza’s works contribute to uncovering not merely
the political logics and ethical challenges that continue to characterise IR, but also
the anthropological, psychological, and sociological dimensions of international
political life. Finally, perhaps the most important ﬁnding of both the IR theorist
Carr and the philosopher Spinoza is that both these Realist thinkers ‘who have
made their mark on history’ identify the importance of emotion as a category of
analysis and demonstrate (even if they occasionally underestimate) the power the
emotions have over political existence.
111 E. H. Carr, Britain, p. 175.
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omit from future editions. A. L. Rowse, ‘Review of The Twenty Years’ Crisis’, The Economic Journal,
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